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Vekâlet Savaşında Yanlış Hesap: Suriye İç Savaşında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Rusya’ya Neoklasik Realist Perspektiften Bakış

Year 2020, Volume: 14 Issue: 27, 243 - 260, 10.12.2020
https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.839015

Abstract

Bu makale dünyadaki en büyük askeri güç olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Suriye İç Savaşında nasıl masanın dışına itildiğini, dünyanın gerileyen gücü Rusya’nın ise tam ters şekilde nasıl tek aktör haline geldiği sorusunu çözmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makale bu soruya neoklasik realist bakış açısıyla cevap verecektir. Buna göre devletler her zaman rasyonel davranmazlar. Yanlış hesap sonucu başarısız olabilirler. Bu bakımdan ABD de Suriye’deki iç savaşı ve politikayı yanlış hesaplamıştır. Buna karşılık, Rusya stratejik kültürüne uygun olarak sahada ve diplomaside hakim hale gelmiştir. Bağımsız değişken olan sistemik uyarıcılar her iki ülkeyi de ittifaklara zorlamıştır. Ara değişken olan iç aktörler ise her iki ülkenin farklı istikametlerde davranamsını sağlamıştır. ABD siyasi eliti bölünmüş bir yapıda olduğu için yanlış hesap yapılmış, Rus eliti ise daha birlik olması dolayısıyla etkili sonuçlar elde etmiştir.

References

  • AKBARZADEH, Shahram, and Arif Saba. “UN paralysis over Syria: The responsibility to protect or regime change?” International Politics 56, no. 4 (2019): 536– 50. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0149-x.
  • ALLISON, Roy. “Russia and Syria: Explaining alignment with a regime in crisis.” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 795–823. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468- 2346.12046. ASSEBURG, Muriel, Wolfram Lacher, and Mareike Transfeld. “Mission impossible? UN mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen.” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Berlin,
  • 2018. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-60446-4. BBC Turkish. “Suriye Annan Planı’nı kabul etti.” 2012. Accessed January 26, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2012/03/120327_syria_annan.
  • BBC Turkish. “Barış Pınarı Harekâtı - Pentagon: Türkiye’nin Olası Harekât Güzergâhı Üzerindeki Güçlerimizin Yerini Değiştirdik.” 2019. Accessed November 4, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-49980630.
  • CROSSTON, Matthew D. “Cold War and Ayatollah Residues Syria as a Chessboard for Russia, Iran, and the United States.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 8, no. 4 (2014): 94–111.
  • CROWLEY, Michael, and Carlotta Gall. “In Trump, Turkey’s Erdogan Keeps Finding a Sympathetic Ear.” Accessed November 4, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/politics/trump-erdogan-turkey-visit.html.
  • ÇAKMAK, Cenap, and Ali Onur Özçelik. “The World Community and the Arab Spring.” 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60985-0.
  • DEMIRCI, Yasin. “Suriye Krizinde “Anayasa Komitesi” Dönemeci.” Accessed October 28, 2019. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/info/info/infografik/15990.

Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective

Year 2020, Volume: 14 Issue: 27, 243 - 260, 10.12.2020
https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.839015

Abstract

This article aims to puzzle why the leading military power of the world, namely the United States, was pushed back from the negotiating table in the Syrian Civil War, and conversely, how and why the world’s declining power, namely Russia, became the sole actor in that conflict. The article will try to answer this question from the neoclassical realist perspective. In this perspective, states do not always act rationally. Instead, they can fail because of miscalculations. The United States, in this respect, miscalculated on the Syrian Civil War as well as its domestic politics. In contrast, Russia behaved in accordance with its strategic culture, which resulted in its dominance both in the field and in diplomacy. The systemic stimulus, which is the independent variable, forces both countries to form alliances in the civil war. The
domestic actors of both countries, which are the intervening variables, diversified the systemic stimuli in opposite directions. While the US political elite was misguided due to the divided structure, the Russian elite was more unified, which resulted in outcomes in favor of the latter.

References

  • AKBARZADEH, Shahram, and Arif Saba. “UN paralysis over Syria: The responsibility to protect or regime change?” International Politics 56, no. 4 (2019): 536– 50. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0149-x.
  • ALLISON, Roy. “Russia and Syria: Explaining alignment with a regime in crisis.” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 795–823. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468- 2346.12046. ASSEBURG, Muriel, Wolfram Lacher, and Mareike Transfeld. “Mission impossible? UN mediation in Libya, Syria and Yemen.” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Berlin,
  • 2018. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-60446-4. BBC Turkish. “Suriye Annan Planı’nı kabul etti.” 2012. Accessed January 26, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2012/03/120327_syria_annan.
  • BBC Turkish. “Barış Pınarı Harekâtı - Pentagon: Türkiye’nin Olası Harekât Güzergâhı Üzerindeki Güçlerimizin Yerini Değiştirdik.” 2019. Accessed November 4, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-49980630.
  • CROSSTON, Matthew D. “Cold War and Ayatollah Residues Syria as a Chessboard for Russia, Iran, and the United States.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 8, no. 4 (2014): 94–111.
  • CROWLEY, Michael, and Carlotta Gall. “In Trump, Turkey’s Erdogan Keeps Finding a Sympathetic Ear.” Accessed November 4, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/politics/trump-erdogan-turkey-visit.html.
  • ÇAKMAK, Cenap, and Ali Onur Özçelik. “The World Community and the Arab Spring.” 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60985-0.
  • DEMIRCI, Yasin. “Suriye Krizinde “Anayasa Komitesi” Dönemeci.” Accessed October 28, 2019. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/info/info/infografik/15990.
There are 8 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Osman Şen This is me 0000-0002-4539-6243

Mehmet Şahin 0000-0002-0142-6666

Publication Date December 10, 2020
Published in Issue Year 2020 Volume: 14 Issue: 27

Cite

APA Şen, O., & Şahin, M. (2020). Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective. Gazi Akademik Bakış, 14(27), 243-260. https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.839015
AMA Şen O, Şahin M. Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective. Gazi Akademik Bakış. December 2020;14(27):243-260. doi:10.19060/gav.839015
Chicago Şen, Osman, and Mehmet Şahin. “Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective”. Gazi Akademik Bakış 14, no. 27 (December 2020): 243-60. https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.839015.
EndNote Şen O, Şahin M (December 1, 2020) Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective. Gazi Akademik Bakış 14 27 243–260.
IEEE O. Şen and M. Şahin, “Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective”, Gazi Akademik Bakış, vol. 14, no. 27, pp. 243–260, 2020, doi: 10.19060/gav.839015.
ISNAD Şen, Osman - Şahin, Mehmet. “Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective”. Gazi Akademik Bakış 14/27 (December 2020), 243-260. https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.839015.
JAMA Şen O, Şahin M. Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective. Gazi Akademik Bakış. 2020;14:243–260.
MLA Şen, Osman and Mehmet Şahin. “Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective”. Gazi Akademik Bakış, vol. 14, no. 27, 2020, pp. 243-60, doi:10.19060/gav.839015.
Vancouver Şen O, Şahin M. Miscalculation in Proxy War: The United States and Russia in Syrian Civil War from the Neoclassical Realist Perspective. Gazi Akademik Bakış. 2020;14(27):243-60.

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