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Matching with Restricted Preferences

Year 2009, Volume: 10 Issue: 10, - , 01.12.2009

Mustafa Doğan

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information. The model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges have unanimous preferences – students with higher ranking in the national examinations are always preferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

Keywords

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References

  • Balinski, M. and T. Sonmez (1999), “A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement”, Journal of Economic Theory, 84: 73–94.
  • Gale, D. and L. Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9–15.
  • Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayar (1990), Two–Sided Matching: A Study in Game–Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
  • Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor (1992), “Two Sided Matching,” in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, (eds.) Aumann R. and S. Hart, North Holland: Elsevier, 485–541.

Matching with Restricted Preferences

Year 2009, Volume: 10 Issue: 10, - , 01.12.2009

Mustafa Doğan

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of the introduction of restrictions on the statement of preferences in a two–sided matching model with incomplete information. The model is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges have unanimous preferences – students with higher ranking in the national examinations are always preferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students' preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

Keywords

-

References

  • Balinski, M. and T. Sonmez (1999), “A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement”, Journal of Economic Theory, 84: 73–94.
  • Gale, D. and L. Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9–15.
  • Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayar (1990), Two–Sided Matching: A Study in Game–Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
  • Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor (1992), “Two Sided Matching,” in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, (eds.) Aumann R. and S. Hart, North Holland: Elsevier, 485–541.
There are 4 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Mustafa Doğan

Publication Date December 1, 2009
Submission Date December 12, 2014
Published in Issue Year 2009 Volume: 10 Issue: 10

Cite

APA Doğan, M. (2009). Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi, 10(10). https://doi.org/10.17233/se.45378
AMA Doğan M. Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi. October 2009;10(10). doi:10.17233/se.45378
Chicago Doğan, Mustafa. “Matching With Restricted Preferences”. Sosyoekonomi 10, no. 10 (October 2009). https://doi.org/10.17233/se.45378.
EndNote Doğan M (October 1, 2009) Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi 10 10
IEEE M. Doğan, “Matching with Restricted Preferences”, Sosyoekonomi, vol. 10, no. 10, 2009, doi: 10.17233/se.45378.
ISNAD Doğan, Mustafa. “Matching With Restricted Preferences”. Sosyoekonomi 10/10 (October 2009). https://doi.org/10.17233/se.45378.
JAMA Doğan M. Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi. 2009;10. doi:10.17233/se.45378.
MLA Doğan, Mustafa. “Matching With Restricted Preferences”. Sosyoekonomi, vol. 10, no. 10, 2009, doi:10.17233/se.45378.
Vancouver Doğan M. Matching with Restricted Preferences. Sosyoekonomi. 2009;10(10).
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