Öz
In 1985, Eastman Kodak stopped the sales of replacement parts to Independent
Service Organizations (ISOs) whereby it was compelled consumers to use its aftermarket service and goods. ISOs blamed Eastman Kodak that to have a monopoly on market so they complained to the The District Court. The first case was resulted in favor of Kodak however the case was appealed in Supreme Court. In this study under the framework of antitrust law examined Supreme Court verdict which defined Aftermarket as a continuation of economics market. According to verdict of Supreme Court the Aftermarket associated with economics market and restrictions for competitive markets must considered with antitrust laws to be maximize consumers welfare.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Aftermarket; Kodak Case; Antitrust Implications; Imperfect Competition; Competition Policy
Kaynakça
- Borenstein, S., MacKie-Mason, J. K., & Netz, J. S. (1994). Antitrust policy in aftermarkets. Antitrust LJ, 63, 455.
- Borenstein, S., MacKie-Mason, J. K., & Netz, J. S. (1995). The economics of customer lock-in and market power in services In P. T. Harker (Ed.). The Service Productivity and Quality Challenge. (p. 225-250). Kluwer Academic.
- Borenstein, S., MacKie‐Mason, J. K., & Netz, J. S. (2000). Exercising market power in proprietary aftermarkets. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9(2), 157-188.
- Bork, R. H. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Cabral, L. (2014). Aftermarket power and foremarket competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.35 p. 60-69.
- Calvani, T. ve Siegfried, J. (1979). Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law. Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown & Company.
- Farrell, J., & Shapiro, C. (1989). Optimal contracts with lock-in. The American Economic Review, 51-68.
- Kattan, J. (1993). Market power in the presence of an installed base. Antitrust Law Journal, 1-21.
- Kintner, E., & Joelson, M. (1974). An International Antitrust Primer. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc
- Klein, B. (1993). Market power in antitrust: Economic analysis after Kodak.Supreme Court Economic Review, 43-92.
- Shapiro, C., & Teece, D. J. (1994). Systems competition and aftermarkets: An economic analysis of Kodak. Antitrust Bull., 39, 135.
- Shapiro, C. (1995). Aftermarkets and consumer welfare: Making sense of Kodak. Antitrust Law Journal, 483-511.
Öz
1985 yılında Eastman Kodak firması Satış Sonrası Servis Hizmeti veren firmalara yedek parça
satışını durdurmuş ve müşterileri kendi servisini kullanmaya mecbur bırakmıştır. Independent
Service Organizations (ISOs) Kodak’ı tekel olmaya çalışmakla suçlamış bu yüzden Bölge
Mahkemesine şikâyet etmişlerdir. İlk dava Kodak lehine sonuçlanmış ancak karar temyiz için
Anayasa Mahkemesi’ne (Supreme Court) taşınmıştır. Bu çalışma Anti-tröst yasası çerçevesinde
‚Satış Sonrası Ürün ve Hizmet‛ piyasasını ekonomik piyasanın devamı olarak tanımlayan
Amerikan Yüksek Mahkemesi Kararını analiz etmiştir. Yüksek Mahkemenin kararına göre Satış
Sonrası Ürün – Hizmet piyasası (aftermarket) birincil satış piyasası ile ilgilidir. Yüksek
mahkemenin kararına göre satış sonrası piyasası, ekonomik piyasa ile ilişkilidir ve tüketicinin
refahı açısından rekabeti etkileyecek kısıtlamalar tekelleşme karşıtı yasalar açısından
değerlendirilmelidir.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Satış Sonrası Piyasası Kodak Kararı Anti-Tröst Uygulamaları Eksik Rekabet Rekabet politikası
Kaynakça
- Borenstein, S., MacKie-Mason, J. K., & Netz, J. S. (1994). Antitrust policy in aftermarkets. Antitrust LJ, 63, 455.
- Borenstein, S., MacKie-Mason, J. K., & Netz, J. S. (1995). The economics of customer lock-in and market power in services In P. T. Harker (Ed.). The Service Productivity and Quality Challenge. (p. 225-250). Kluwer Academic.
- Borenstein, S., MacKie‐Mason, J. K., & Netz, J. S. (2000). Exercising market power in proprietary aftermarkets. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9(2), 157-188.
- Bork, R. H. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Cabral, L. (2014). Aftermarket power and foremarket competition. International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.35 p. 60-69.
- Calvani, T. ve Siegfried, J. (1979). Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law. Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown & Company.
- Farrell, J., & Shapiro, C. (1989). Optimal contracts with lock-in. The American Economic Review, 51-68.
- Kattan, J. (1993). Market power in the presence of an installed base. Antitrust Law Journal, 1-21.
- Kintner, E., & Joelson, M. (1974). An International Antitrust Primer. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc
- Klein, B. (1993). Market power in antitrust: Economic analysis after Kodak.Supreme Court Economic Review, 43-92.
- Shapiro, C., & Teece, D. J. (1994). Systems competition and aftermarkets: An economic analysis of Kodak. Antitrust Bull., 39, 135.
- Shapiro, C. (1995). Aftermarkets and consumer welfare: Making sense of Kodak. Antitrust Law Journal, 483-511.
Ayrıntılar
| Birincil Dil | Türkçe |
|---|---|
| Bölüm | Makaleler |
| Yazarlar | |
| Yayımlanma Tarihi | 24 Mart 2015 |
| Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2015 Cilt: 4 Sayı: 1 |
Cited By
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy with a Focus on Biotechnology
SSRN Electronic Journal
Jeremy K. West
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.681195
