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Relationship between Institutional Quality and Corruption: The Case of Turkey

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 18 Sayı: 2, 443 - 459, 01.08.2023
https://doi.org/10.17153/oguiibf.1254151

Öz

The relationship between the level of corruption and the quality of Turkey's institutional structure was investigated in this study. Using quarterly data between 1984-2015, RALS-ADF unit root and RALS-EG cointegration tests were used to determine if there is a relationship between these variables in Turkey. Corruption level is the dependent variable, institutional quality is the independent variable, and the total production index is the control variable. The first analysis included both the coalition and single-party periods. Also, a separate analysis was carried out for the coalition period 1984-2002. There was no correlation between corruption and institutional quality in either analysis.

Kaynakça

  • Abed, M. G. T. & Gupta, M. S. (2002), Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. Washington: International Monetary Fund.
  • Acaravcı, A., Artan, S., Erdoğan, S. & Göktürk, T. B. (2018), “Türkiye’de Kurumsal Kalite, Reel Gelir ve Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar İlişkisi”, Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 5, No. 2: 132-145.
  • Aidt, T., Dutta, J. & Sena, V. (2008), “Governance Regimes, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2: 195-220.
  • Artan, S. & Hayaloğlu, P. (2014), “Kurumsal Yapı ve İktisadi Büyüme İlişkisi: Türkiye Örneği”, Sosyoekonomi, Vol. 22, No. 2: 347-365.
  • Bardhan, P. (1997), “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 3: 1320-1346.
  • Barnes, T. D. & Beaulieu, E. (2019), “Women Politicians, Institutions, and Perceptions of Corruption”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1: 134-167.
  • Breen, M. & Gillanders, R. (2012), “Corruption, Institutions and Regulation”, Economics of Governance, Vol. 13, No. 3: 263-285.
  • Broadman, H. G. & Recanatini, F. (2001), “Seeds of Corruption–Do Market Institutions Matter?.” MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, Vol. 11, No. 4: 359-392.
  • Brol, M. (2016), “Institutional Determinants of Corruption”, Ekonomia i Prawo. Economics and Law, Vol. 15, No.1: 21-32.
  • Campos, N. F., Dimova, R., & Saleh, A. (2016). “Corruption and Economic Growth: An econometric survey of the evidence”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 172, No. 3: 521-543.
  • Campos, N. F. & Giovannoni, F. (2017), “Political Institutions, Lobbying and Corruption”, Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4: 917-939.
  • Ceva, E. & Ferretti, M. P. (2017), “Political Corruption”, Philosophy Compass, Vol. 12, No. 12, e12461.
  • Çiçen, Y. B. (2019), “Türkiye’nin 1980 Sonrası Kurumsal Yapısındaki Değişimi ve Ekonomik Sonuçları”, Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 37, No. 3: 423-438.
  • Colella, D. S. (2020), “Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği (AB) İlişkilerinde 1990'lı Yılların Analizi”, Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Akademi Dergisi, Vol.3: 26-56.
  • Collier, M. W. (2002), “Explaining Corruption: An Institutional Choice Approach”, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 38, No. 1: 1-32.
  • Çakır, E. M. (2020), “1991-2002 Yılları Arasında Koalisyon Hükümetleri Yönetimi”, IBAD Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol. 6: 19-37.
  • De Vaal, A. & Ebben, W. (2011), “Institutions and the Relation between Corruption and Economic Growth”, Review of Development Economics, Vol. 15, No. 1: 108-123.
  • Dreher, A., Kotsogiannis, C. & McCorriston, S. (2009), “How Do Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy?”, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 16, No. 6: 773.
  • Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/ (Access: 30.11.2020).
  • Emek, U. & Acar, M. (2008), “Yolsuzlukla Mücadelede Bir Temel Soru(n): Kurumsal Tekelcilik mi, Çoğulculuk mu?.”, İktisat İşletme ve Finans, Vol. 23, No. 270: 64-89.
  • Fjelde, H. & Hegre, H. (2014), “Political Corruption and Institutional Stability”, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 49, No. 3: 267-299.
  • Fritzen, S. (2005), “Beyond "Political Will": How Institutional Context Shapes the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policies”, Policy and Society, Vol. 24, No. 3: 79-96.
  • Gerring, J. & Thacker, S. C. (2004), “Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No: 2: 295-330.
  • Heckelman, J. C. & Powell, B. (2010), “Corruption and the Institutional Environment for Growth”, Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3: 351-378.
  • Heller, W. B., Kyriacou, A. P. & Roca‐Sagalés, O. (2016), “Institutional Checks and Corruption: The Effect of Formal Agenda Access on Governance”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 55, No.4: 681-701.
  • Hope Sr, K. R. (2017), “Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries: Some Aspects of Policy from Lessons from the Field”, Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4, e1683.
  • Im, K. S., Lee, J. & Tieslau, M. A. (2014), “More Powerful Unit Root Tests with Non-Normal Errors”, (Ed. R.C. Sickles and W.C. Horrace), Festschrift in Honor of Peter Schmidt, New York: Springer: 315-342.
  • International Country Risk Guide, https://epub.prsgroup.com/index.php/country-database/country-data, (Access: 26.11.2020).
  • LaPalombara, J. (1994), “Structural and Institutional Aspects of Corruption”, Social Research, Vol. 61, No. 2: 325-350.
  • Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V. & Soares, R. R. (2005), “Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter”, Economics & Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1: 1-35.
  • Lee, H., Lee, J. & Im, K. (2015), “More Powerful Cointegration Tests with Non-normal Errors”, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, Vol. 19, No. 4: 397-413.
  • Liu, J., Hu, M., Zhang, H. & Carrick, J. (2019), “Corruption and Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Vol. 55, No. 5: 1051-1068.
  • MacIntyre, A. (2003), “Institutions and the Political Economy of Corruption in Developing Countries”, Workshop on Corruption, Stanford University, Vol. 31.
  • Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 3: 681-712.
  • Méon, P. G. & Sekkat, K. (2005), “Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?.” Public Choice, Vol. 122, No. 1-2: 69-97.
  • Méon, P. G. & Weill, L. (2010), “Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?.” World Development, Vol. 38, No. 3: 244-259.
  • Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1991), “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2: 503-530.
  • Obydenkova, A. V. & Arpino, B. (2018), “Corruption and Trust in the European Union and National Institutions: Changes over the Great Recession across European States”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3: 594-611.
  • Oral, B. G. (2011), “Yolsuzlukla Uluslararası Alanda Mücadele ve Türkiye'de Yolsuzlukla Mücadelenin Kurumsal Yapısı”, Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, Vol. 30, No. 1: 163-192.
  • Shah, A. & Schacter, M. (2004), “Combating Corruption: Look Before You Leap”, Finance and Development, Vol. 41, No. 4: 40-43.
  • Şen, S. (2020), “Yolsuzluk Ekonomi ve Devlet Üzerine Bir İnceleme”, Kamu Politikalarında Mali ve İktisadi Yapıdaki Dönüşüm: Yerelden Globale Teori, Beklentiler ve Uygulama, (Ed. Ş. Karabulut), Ankara: Gazi Kitabevi: 387-407.
  • Taşar, M. O. & Çevik, S. (2017), “Yolsuzluk ve Rüşvetin Kültürel Belirleyicileri”, Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Vol.38: 140-153.
  • Uberti, L. J. (2016), “Can Institutional Reforms Reduce Corruption? Economic Theory and Patron–client Politics in Developing Countries”, Development and Change, Vol. 47, No. 2: 317-345.
  • Venard, B. (2013), “Institutions, Corruption and Sustainable Development”, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 33, No. 4: 2545-2562.
  • Worlwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/, (Access: 23.11.2020).

Kurum Kalitesi ve Yolsuzluk İlişkisi: Türkiye Örneği

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 18 Sayı: 2, 443 - 459, 01.08.2023
https://doi.org/10.17153/oguiibf.1254151

Öz

Bu çalışmada Türkiye’de yolsuzluk düzeyi ve kurumsal yapının kalitesi ilişkisi ele alınmıştır. Kurumsal yapının kalitesi yolsuzluk açısından önemlidir. Türkiye’de bu ilişkinin olup olmadığının ortaya koyulması amacıyla 1984-2015 yılları arası çeyreklik verilerden faydalanılarak RALS-ADF birim kök testi ve RALS-EG eşbütünleşme testi uygulanmıştır. Kullanılan değişkenler; bağımlı değişken olarak yolsuzluk düzeyi, bağımsız değişken olarak kurumsal kaliteyi temsilen politik risk derecesi ve kontrol değişkeni olarak toplam üretim endeksidir. Öncelikle koalisyon ve tek parti dönemi birlikte analiz edilmiştir. İkinci olarak sadece koalisyon dönemini içeren 1984-2002 dönemine ilişkin analiz gerçekleştirilmiştir. Her iki analizde de Türkiye’de yolsuzluk düzeyi ve kurumsal yapının kalitesi arasında bir eşbütünleşme ilişkisi bulunmamıştır.

Kaynakça

  • Abed, M. G. T. & Gupta, M. S. (2002), Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. Washington: International Monetary Fund.
  • Acaravcı, A., Artan, S., Erdoğan, S. & Göktürk, T. B. (2018), “Türkiye’de Kurumsal Kalite, Reel Gelir ve Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar İlişkisi”, Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 5, No. 2: 132-145.
  • Aidt, T., Dutta, J. & Sena, V. (2008), “Governance Regimes, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2: 195-220.
  • Artan, S. & Hayaloğlu, P. (2014), “Kurumsal Yapı ve İktisadi Büyüme İlişkisi: Türkiye Örneği”, Sosyoekonomi, Vol. 22, No. 2: 347-365.
  • Bardhan, P. (1997), “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 3: 1320-1346.
  • Barnes, T. D. & Beaulieu, E. (2019), “Women Politicians, Institutions, and Perceptions of Corruption”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1: 134-167.
  • Breen, M. & Gillanders, R. (2012), “Corruption, Institutions and Regulation”, Economics of Governance, Vol. 13, No. 3: 263-285.
  • Broadman, H. G. & Recanatini, F. (2001), “Seeds of Corruption–Do Market Institutions Matter?.” MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies, Vol. 11, No. 4: 359-392.
  • Brol, M. (2016), “Institutional Determinants of Corruption”, Ekonomia i Prawo. Economics and Law, Vol. 15, No.1: 21-32.
  • Campos, N. F., Dimova, R., & Saleh, A. (2016). “Corruption and Economic Growth: An econometric survey of the evidence”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 172, No. 3: 521-543.
  • Campos, N. F. & Giovannoni, F. (2017), “Political Institutions, Lobbying and Corruption”, Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4: 917-939.
  • Ceva, E. & Ferretti, M. P. (2017), “Political Corruption”, Philosophy Compass, Vol. 12, No. 12, e12461.
  • Çiçen, Y. B. (2019), “Türkiye’nin 1980 Sonrası Kurumsal Yapısındaki Değişimi ve Ekonomik Sonuçları”, Hacettepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 37, No. 3: 423-438.
  • Colella, D. S. (2020), “Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği (AB) İlişkilerinde 1990'lı Yılların Analizi”, Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Akademi Dergisi, Vol.3: 26-56.
  • Collier, M. W. (2002), “Explaining Corruption: An Institutional Choice Approach”, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 38, No. 1: 1-32.
  • Çakır, E. M. (2020), “1991-2002 Yılları Arasında Koalisyon Hükümetleri Yönetimi”, IBAD Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol. 6: 19-37.
  • De Vaal, A. & Ebben, W. (2011), “Institutions and the Relation between Corruption and Economic Growth”, Review of Development Economics, Vol. 15, No. 1: 108-123.
  • Dreher, A., Kotsogiannis, C. & McCorriston, S. (2009), “How Do Institutions Affect Corruption and the Shadow Economy?”, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 16, No. 6: 773.
  • Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası Elektronik Veri Dağıtım Sistemi, https://evds2.tcmb.gov.tr/ (Access: 30.11.2020).
  • Emek, U. & Acar, M. (2008), “Yolsuzlukla Mücadelede Bir Temel Soru(n): Kurumsal Tekelcilik mi, Çoğulculuk mu?.”, İktisat İşletme ve Finans, Vol. 23, No. 270: 64-89.
  • Fjelde, H. & Hegre, H. (2014), “Political Corruption and Institutional Stability”, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 49, No. 3: 267-299.
  • Fritzen, S. (2005), “Beyond "Political Will": How Institutional Context Shapes the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Policies”, Policy and Society, Vol. 24, No. 3: 79-96.
  • Gerring, J. & Thacker, S. C. (2004), “Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of Unitarism and Parliamentarism”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No: 2: 295-330.
  • Heckelman, J. C. & Powell, B. (2010), “Corruption and the Institutional Environment for Growth”, Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3: 351-378.
  • Heller, W. B., Kyriacou, A. P. & Roca‐Sagalés, O. (2016), “Institutional Checks and Corruption: The Effect of Formal Agenda Access on Governance”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 55, No.4: 681-701.
  • Hope Sr, K. R. (2017), “Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries: Some Aspects of Policy from Lessons from the Field”, Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4, e1683.
  • Im, K. S., Lee, J. & Tieslau, M. A. (2014), “More Powerful Unit Root Tests with Non-Normal Errors”, (Ed. R.C. Sickles and W.C. Horrace), Festschrift in Honor of Peter Schmidt, New York: Springer: 315-342.
  • International Country Risk Guide, https://epub.prsgroup.com/index.php/country-database/country-data, (Access: 26.11.2020).
  • LaPalombara, J. (1994), “Structural and Institutional Aspects of Corruption”, Social Research, Vol. 61, No. 2: 325-350.
  • Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V. & Soares, R. R. (2005), “Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter”, Economics & Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1: 1-35.
  • Lee, H., Lee, J. & Im, K. (2015), “More Powerful Cointegration Tests with Non-normal Errors”, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, Vol. 19, No. 4: 397-413.
  • Liu, J., Hu, M., Zhang, H. & Carrick, J. (2019), “Corruption and Entrepreneurship in Emerging Markets”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Vol. 55, No. 5: 1051-1068.
  • MacIntyre, A. (2003), “Institutions and the Political Economy of Corruption in Developing Countries”, Workshop on Corruption, Stanford University, Vol. 31.
  • Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 3: 681-712.
  • Méon, P. G. & Sekkat, K. (2005), “Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?.” Public Choice, Vol. 122, No. 1-2: 69-97.
  • Méon, P. G. & Weill, L. (2010), “Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?.” World Development, Vol. 38, No. 3: 244-259.
  • Murphy, K. M., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1991), “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2: 503-530.
  • Obydenkova, A. V. & Arpino, B. (2018), “Corruption and Trust in the European Union and National Institutions: Changes over the Great Recession across European States”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3: 594-611.
  • Oral, B. G. (2011), “Yolsuzlukla Uluslararası Alanda Mücadele ve Türkiye'de Yolsuzlukla Mücadelenin Kurumsal Yapısı”, Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, Vol. 30, No. 1: 163-192.
  • Shah, A. & Schacter, M. (2004), “Combating Corruption: Look Before You Leap”, Finance and Development, Vol. 41, No. 4: 40-43.
  • Şen, S. (2020), “Yolsuzluk Ekonomi ve Devlet Üzerine Bir İnceleme”, Kamu Politikalarında Mali ve İktisadi Yapıdaki Dönüşüm: Yerelden Globale Teori, Beklentiler ve Uygulama, (Ed. Ş. Karabulut), Ankara: Gazi Kitabevi: 387-407.
  • Taşar, M. O. & Çevik, S. (2017), “Yolsuzluk ve Rüşvetin Kültürel Belirleyicileri”, Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Vol.38: 140-153.
  • Uberti, L. J. (2016), “Can Institutional Reforms Reduce Corruption? Economic Theory and Patron–client Politics in Developing Countries”, Development and Change, Vol. 47, No. 2: 317-345.
  • Venard, B. (2013), “Institutions, Corruption and Sustainable Development”, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 33, No. 4: 2545-2562.
  • Worlwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/, (Access: 23.11.2020).
Toplam 45 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Yıldırım Beyazıt Çiçen 0000-0002-3425-280X

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Ağustos 2023
Gönderilme Tarihi 21 Şubat 2023
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2023 Cilt: 18 Sayı: 2

Kaynak Göster

APA Çiçen, Y. B. (2023). Relationship between Institutional Quality and Corruption: The Case of Turkey. Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 18(2), 443-459. https://doi.org/10.17153/oguiibf.1254151